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Abstract
We provide a new modus operandi for the computation of the nucleolus in cooperative games with
transferable utility. Using the concept of dual game we extend the theory of characterization sets. Dually
essential and  if the game is monotonic  dually saturated coalitions determine both the core and the
nucleolus whenever the core is non-empty. We show how these two sets are related to the existing
characterization sets. In particular we prove that if the grand coalition is vital then the intersection of
essential and dually essential coalitions forms a characterization set itself.
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1. Introduction
The nucleolus, introduced by Schmeidler [29],
is one of the most frequently applied cooperative
game theoretical solution concept. Much like the
Shapley-value it suﬀers from computational dif-
ﬁculties. Determining the nucleolus is NP-hard
for various classes of games such as minimum cost
spanning tree games [7], voting games [6] and ﬂow
and linear production games [5]. Recently Greco
et al. [13] provided a non-trivial upper bound for
its complexity. On the other hand there are known
polynomial time algorithms for computing the nu-
cleolus of important families of cooperative games,
like standard tree [21], assignment [31], match-
ing [16] and bankruptcy games [2]. In addition,
Kuipers [18] and Arin and Inarra [1] developed
methods to compute the nucleolus for convex games.
In contrast to the Shapley-value, there is no
formula for the nucleolus. One way to compute
it is to use linear programming. The sequential
LP approach of Maschler et al. [20] was the ﬁrst
computationally tractable one. Since then there
have been many attempts to improve the compu-
tation process see e.g. [28, 8, 25, 26]. Although all
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the proposed LPs consist of exponentially many
inequalities they can be solved eﬃciently if one
knows which constraints are redundant. Huber-
man [15], Granot et al. [12] and Reijnierse and
Potters [27] provided methods to identify coalitions
that correspond to non-redundant constraints.
This idea was already suggested by Megiddo
[23], but the formal theoretical framework was de-
veloped by Granot et al. [12]. They introduced the
concept of characterization sets, namely a collec-
tion of coalitions that itself determines the nucleo-
lus, and proved that if the size of the characteriza-
tion set is polynomially bounded in the number of
players, then the nucleolus of the game can be com-
puted in strongly polynomial time. A collection
that characterizes the nucleolus in a game need not
characterize it in another game. Thus we are inter-
ested in a property of the coalitional function that
describes a characterization set in every game in
a suﬃciently large class of games. Huberman [15]
was the ﬁrst to show that such a property exists in
the very important class of balanced games. He in-
troduced the concept of essential coalitions which
are coalitions that have no weakly majorizing par-
tition, and proved that if the core is non-empty,
the family of essential coalitions itself determines
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the nucleolus. Granot et al. [12] provided another
collection that characterize the nucleolus in cost
games with non-empty core.
We introduce two new characterization sets:
dually essential and dually saturated coalitions.
We show that both sets (in themselves) determine
the core, and if the core is non-empty they deter-
mine the nucleolus as well. We conclude by ana-
lyzing the relationship of the four known charac-
terizing properties.
2. Game-theoretic framework
A cooperative game with transferable utility is
an ordered pair (N, v) consisting of the player set
N = {1, 2, . . . , n} and a characteristic function v :
2N → R with v(∅) = 0. The value v(S) represents
the worth of coalition S. Let P = 2N \ {∅, N}
denote the family of the non-trivial coalitions. A
cooperative game (N, v) is called monotonic if S ⊆
T ⊆ N ⇒ v(S) ≤ v(T ). A general assumption
in cooperative games is that the grand coalition
(N) forms. The question is then how to distribute
v(N) among the players in some fair way.
An outcome for a cooperative game Γ = (N, v)
is a vector x ∈ RN that represents the payoﬀ of
each player. For convenience, we introduce the no-
tation x(S) =
∑
i∈S xi for any S ⊆ N , and instead
of x({i}) we simply write x(i). A solution is called
eﬃcient if x(N) = v(N) and individually rational
if x(i) ≥ v(i) for all i ∈ N . Eﬃcient solutions will
also be called allocations. The imputation set I(Γ)
of the game Γ consists of the eﬃcient and indi-
vidually rational solutions, formally, I(Γ) = {x ∈
RN | x(N) = v(N), x(i) ≥ v(i) for all i ∈ N}.
Given a payoﬀ vector x ∈ RN , we deﬁne the satis-
faction of coalition S in game Γ as
satΓ(S, x) := x(S)− v(S).
The satisfaction of the grand coalition is clearly
zero at any allocation. The core C(Γ) of coopera-
tive game Γ is the set of allocations where all the
satisfaction values are non-negative. Formally,
C(Γ) = {x ∈ RN | satΓ(N, x) = 0,
satΓ(S, x) ≥ 0 for all S ∈ P}.
A game is called balanced if its core in non-empty.
In this paper we will consider only balanced games.
Notice that core vectors of monotonic games are
non-negative. Indeed, x(i) ≥ v(i) ≥ v(∅) = 0 for
all i ∈ N .
We say that a vector x ∈ Rm lexicographically
precedes y ∈ Rm (denoted by x  y) if either x = y
or there exists a number 1 ≤ j ≤ m such that
xi = yi if i < j and xj < yj . Let Γ = (N, v) be
a game and let θP(x) ∈ R2n−2 be the vector that
contains the 2n − 2 satisfaction values satΓ(S, x),
S ∈ P, in a non-decreasing order.
Deﬁnition 1. The nucleolus of a cooperative game
Γ is the subset of the payoﬀ vectors x ∈ I(Γ) that
lexicographically maximize θP(x). Formally,
N(Γ) = {x ∈ I(Γ) | θP(y)  θP(x) ∀y ∈ I(Γ)}.
Schmeidler [29] proved that N(Γ) consists of a
single point, and that it is a continuous function
of the characteristic function. Although formally a
set, we will consider N(Γ) as an allocation vector.
It is straightforward that N(Γ) ∈ C(Γ) whenever
C(Γ) is non-empty.
Kohlberg [17] oﬀered a method to verify whether
an allocation coincides with the nucleolus. Let
eS ∈ {0, 1}N denote the membership vector of
coalition S, that is, (eS)i = 1 if i ∈ S and (eS)i = 0
otherwise. A collection of coalitions BS ⊆ P is
said to be S-balanced if there exist positive weights
λT , T ∈ BS , such that
∑
T∈BS λT eT = eS . An N -
balanced collection is simply called balanced.
Theorem 2 (Kohlberg [17]). Let Γ = (N, v) be
a game. Then an allocation x is the nucleolus
if and only if for all y ∈ R the collection {S ∈
P | satΓ(S, x) ≤ y} is balanced or empty.
3. Characterization sets
In the following we will use the formalism of
Granot et al. [12].
Deﬁnition 3. Let ΓF = (N,F , v) be a cooperative
game with coalition formation restrictions, where
∅ 6= F ⊆ P consists of all coalitions deemed per-
missible besides the grand coalition N . Let θF (x) ∈
2
R|F| be the restricted vector that contains the satis-
faction values satΓ(S, x), S ∈ F in a non-decreasing
order. Furthermore, let N(ΓF ) be deﬁned as the
set of allocations that lexicographically maximize
θF (x). Then F is called a characterization set for
the nucleolus of the game Γ = (N, v), if N(ΓF ) =
N(Γ).
Note the diﬀerent roles of N and the coalitions
in F in the above optimization. The satisfaction
of the grand coalition is required to be constantly
zero (deﬁning the feasible set), whereas the satis-
factions of the smaller permissible coalitions form
the objective function. Notice that N(ΓF ) is a sin-
gleton if and only if rank({eS : S ∈ {N}∪F}) = n.
Most relevant to our setting is the following theo-
rem of Granot et al. [12].
Theorem 4. Let Γ be a cooperative game with a
non-empty core. The non-empty collection F ⊆
P is a characterisation set for the nucleolus of Γ
if for every S ∈ P \ F there exists a non-empty
subcollection FS of F , such that
i. satΓ(T, x) ≤ satΓ(S, x) for all x ∈ C(Γ), when-
ever T ∈ FS,
ii. eS can be expressed as a linear combination of
the vectors in {eT : T ∈ FS ∪ {N}}.
Observe that the above conditions are suﬃcient
but not at all necessary. Take for example the (su-
peradditive and balanced) proﬁt game with four
players N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and the following coali-
tional function: v(i) = 0, v(i, j) = 1, v(i, j, k) = 3
for any i, j, k ∈ N and v(N) = 4. Then the 2-
player coalitions and the grand coalition are suﬃ-
cient to determine the nucleolus, which is given by
z(i) = 1 for all i ∈ N . However, the 3-player coali-
tions have smaller satisfaction values at z, thus the
ﬁrst condition of Theorem 4 is violated. Notice
that in this game the 3-player coalitions and the
grand coalition are also suﬃcient to determine the
nucleolus.
In general neither the 2-player nor the 3-player
coalitions (and the grand coalition) characterize
the nucleolus. The fact that in this example they
did was due to the particular choice (most impor-
tantly the symmetry) of the coalitional function.
We would like to identify properties of coalitions
that characterize the nucleolus independently of
the realization of the coalitional function.
The Kohlberg-criterion applied to games with
coalition formation restrictions yields the following
theorem.
Theorem 5 (Maschler et al. [22]). Let F be a
characterization set and x be an imputation of the
game Γ with C(Γ) 6= ∅. Then x = N(Γ) if and only
if for all y ∈ R the collection {S ∈ F | satΓ(S, x) ≤
y} is balanced or empty.
A similar criterion appears in [14]. With the
help of the Kohlberg-criterion the problem of ﬁnd-
ing the nucleolus is reduced to ﬁnding the right
characterization set. The ﬁrst characterization set
for balanced games is due to Huberman [15].
Deﬁnition 6 (Essential coalitions). Let N be a
set of players, (N, v) a cooperative game. Coalition
S ∈ P is called essential in game Γ = (N, v) if it
can not be partitioned as S = S1
.∪ . . . .∪ Sk with
k ≥ 2 and Sj 6= ∅ for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k such that S is
weakly majorized by S1, . . . , Sk, that is
v(S) ≤ v(S1) + . . .+ v(Sk).
The set of essential coalitions is denoted by E(Γ).
A coalition that is not essential is called inessen-
tial.
A similar criterion can be formulated for cost
games, but there the inequality is reversed, i.e.
c(S) ≥ c(S1) + . . .+ c(Sk) must hold.
Notice that we call only a non-trivial coalition
essential, although ∅ would always qualify since it
can not be partitioned at all, and N could also
qualify in certain games. On the other hand, the
singleton coalitions are always essential in every
game.
It is easily seen that each inessential coalition
has a weakly majorizing partition which consists
exclusively of essential coalitions. Moreover, the
core is determined by the eﬃciency equation
satΓ(N, x) = 0 and the satΓ(S, x) ≥ 0 inequalities
corresponding to the essential coalitions, all the
other inequalities can be discarded from the core
system. The following important result is due to
Huberman [15].
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Theorem 7 (Huberman [15]). If the core of the
game is non-empty then the essential coalitions form
a characterization set for the nucleolus.
The theorem means that in a balanced game
the essential coalitions and the grand coalition are
suﬃcient to determine the nucleolus. This obser-
vation helps us to eliminate large coalitions which
are redundant for the nucleolus. To detect small
coalitions that are unnecessary for the nucleolus,
we need the concept of dual game.
Deﬁnition 8. The dual game Γ∗ = (N, v∗) of
game Γ = (N, v) is deﬁned by the coalitional func-
tion v∗(S) := v(N)− v(N \ S) for all S ⊆ N .
Notice that v∗(∅) = 0, v∗(N) = v(N), and
(v∗)∗(S) = v(S) for all S ⊆ N . It will be use-
ful to think of the dual game of a proﬁt game as a
cost game and vice versa. It can be easily checked
that v is monotonic if and only if v∗ is monotonic,
and v is supermodular if and only if v∗ is submodu-
lar. However, there is no such dualization relation
between superadditivity and subadditivity. Oishi
and Nakayama [24] provide examples, how impor-
tant classes of cooperative games are connected
through the dual game relation.
We can identify small redundant coalitions, if
we apply Huberman's argument to the dual game.
Deﬁnition 9 (Dually essential coalitions). Let N
be a set of players, (N, v) a cooperative game. Coali-
tion S ∈ P is called dually essential in game (N, v)
if its complement can not be partitioned as N \S =
(N \ T1)
.∪ . . . .∪ (N \ Tk) with k ≥ 2 and Tj 6= N
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k such that
v∗(N \ S) ≥ v∗(N \ T1) + . . .+ v∗(N \ Tk),
or equivalently,
v(S) ≤ v(T1) + . . .+ v(Tk)− (k − 1)v(N).
The set of dually essential coalitions is denoted by
DE(Γ). A coalition that is not dually essential is
called dually inessential.
Similarly, when we formulate this requirement
for cost games, the inequality gets reversed, i.e.
c(S) ≥ c(T1) + . . .+ c(Tk)− (k− 1)c(N) must hold
for such coalitions.
Notice that we call only a non-trivial coalition
dually essential, although the grand coalition would
always, and the empty coalition could sometimes
qualify. On the other hand, all (n − 1)-player
coalitions are dually essential in any game. Ob-
serve that S ∈ P is dually essential if and only if
N \ S ∈ P is essential in the dual game.
If S ∈ P is dually inessential then it is con-
tained in each of the coalitions T1, . . . , Tk ∈ P in
the above expression, but every player in N \ S
appears exactly k− 1 times in this family. We call
such a system of coalitions an overlapping decom-
position of S. For a more general deﬁnition, where
the complements of the overlapping coalitions need
not form a partition of the complement coalition,
see e.g. Brânzei et al. [3] and the references therein.
It is clear that if S, T ∈ P are dually inessen-
tial coalitions and T appears in an overlapping de-
composition of S, then S ( T so S cannot ap-
pear in an overlapping decomposition of T . Conse-
quently, in a cooperative game each dually inessen-
tial coalition has a weakly majorizing overlapping
decomposition which consists exclusively of dually
essential coalitions. Moreover, the core of Γ is
also determined by the dual eﬃciency equation
satΓ∗(N, x) = 0 and the satΓ∗(S, x) ≥ 0 dual in-
equalities corresponding to the complements of the
dually essential coalitions, all the other dual in-
equalities can be discarded from the dual core sys-
tem. The main feature of dually essential coali-
tions is that together with the grand coalition they
are suﬃcient to determine the nucleolus in bal-
anced games. The next theorem is the dual coun-
terpart of Theorem 7.
Proposition 10. If C(Γ) 6= ∅, then the dually
essential coalitions form a characterization set for
N(Γ).
Proof. There are various ways to derive this re-
sult. A formal proof can be obtained by applying
the arguments of Huberman [15] to the dual game.
Here we pursue another way and deduce it from
Theorem 4.
Let S ∈ P be a dually inessential coalition in
the balanced proﬁt game Γ = (N, v). As remarked
earlier, S has a weakly majorizing overlapping de-
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composition T1, . . . , Tk (k ≥ 2) which consists ex-
clusively of dually essential coalitions. Hence ii. of
Theorem 4 follows immediately. To see condition
i., let x ∈ C(Γ). Then
v(S) ≤v(T1) + . . .+ v(Tk)− (k − 1)v(N)
v(S)− x(S) ≤v(T1) + . . .+ v(Tk)−
− (k − 1)x(N)− x(S)
−satΓ(S, x) ≤− (satΓ(T1, x) + . . .+ satΓ(Tk, x))
satΓ(S, x) ≥satΓ(T1, x) + . . .+ satΓ(Tk, x)
satΓ(S, x) ≥satΓ(Tj , x) ≥ 0 ∀j = 1, . . . , k,
where the second inequality comes from v(N) =
x(N), while the third from the identity x(T1)+. . .+
x(Tk) = (k − 1)x(N) + x(S) implied by N \ S =
(N \ T1)
.∪ . . . .∪ (N \ Tk), and the last one from
the non-negativity of the satisfaction values at any
core allocation.
If we look for an as small characterisation set as
possible for balanced games, in light of Theorems 7
and 10 it seems natural to eliminate both inessen-
tial coalitions and dually inessential coalitions at
the same time. However, the intersection of essen-
tial and dually essential coalitions need not yield
a characterization set. For example, in additive
games only the singleton coalitions are essential,
and only the (n − 1)-player coalitions are dually
essential.
The problem lies in what we call a cycle in the
decomposition. This occurs when coalition S can
be discarded because of a collection that contains
coalition T , and T can also be discarded because
of a collection that contains S or another coalition
R that can be eliminated because of a collection
that contains S, etc. As remarked after both def-
initions, such a cycle in the decomposition cannot
occur if we apply only essentiality or only dual es-
sentiality. Strongly essential coalitions discussed
by Brânzei et al. [3] are not immune to this kind
of failure, hence they might not form a characteri-
zation set for the nucleolus in a balanced game in
which the grand coalition is not vital.
Before we show when the two types of concepts
can be mixed, we need some preparation.
A coalition S is called vital if for any S-balanced
collection BS and any system (λT )T∈BS of balanc-
ing weights for BS ,
∑
T∈BS λT v(T ) < v(S) (see
[9, 30]). It is easily seen that the family of vi-
tal coalitions (just like essential coalitions) and the
grand coalition are suﬃcient to determine the core.
However, Maschler et al. [20] demonstrated that vi-
tal coalitions (unlike essential coalitions) and the
grand coalition do not necessarily characterize the
nucleolus in a balanced game.
The next theorem provides a suﬃcient condi-
tion for E(Γ) ∩ DE(Γ) to be a characterization set
for the nucleolus in a balanced game.
Theorem 11. Let Γ = (N, v) be a game with a
non-empty core. If the grand coalition is vital, the
collection E(Γ) ∩ DE(Γ) forms a characterization
set of N(Γ) .
Proof. Suppose coalition S is redundant, that is,
either inessential or dually inessential (or both).
Then there is a series of coalitions S1, . . . , Sk in
E(Γ) or in DE(Γ) that have smaller satisfaction
value than S and whose membership vectors span
eS . Lexicographically maximizing the satisfactions
of S1, . . . , Sk the satisfaction of S becomes ﬁxed.
If there is no cycle in the decomposition then there
exists a decomposition of Si for i = 1, . . . , k that
consist entirely of coalitions T i1, . . . , T
i
ri that belong
to E(Γ) ∩ DE(Γ). Lexicographically maximizing
the satisfactions of T i1, . . . , T
i
ri the satisfaction of
Si becomes ﬁxed. Thus indirectly the satisfaction
of S becomes ﬁxed. We conclude that, if there is
no cycle in the decomposition, then by Theorem 4
E(Γ) ∩ DE(Γ) is a characterization set.
By contradiction suppose that the grand coali-
tion is vital, but there is a cycle T1, T2, . . . , Tr in
the decomposition. Note that we may assume with-
out loss of generality that the series alternates be-
tween inessentiality and dual inessentiality. If T`
and T`+1 were deemed redundant for the same rea-
son (e.g. they are both inessential) then the in-
equality that shows inessentiality of T` can be re-
ﬁned by the inequality that shows inessentiality of
T`+1. Let us assume that T1 is inessential  the
proof is the same if T1 is dually inessential. Thus,
using the deﬁnition of essentiality and dual essen-
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tiality
v(T1) ≤ v(T2) +
k1∑
j=1
v(S1j ) (1)
v(T2) ≤ v(T3) +
k2∑
j=1
v(S2j )− k2 · v(N) (2)
v(T3) ≤ v(T4) +
k3∑
j=1
v(S3j ) (3)
...
v(Tr) ≤ v(T1) +
kr∑
j=1
v(Srj )− kr · v(N) (4)
In words T1 is inessential because of the col-
lection T2, S
1
1 , . . . , S
1
k1
(these are all essential coali-
tions, thus the inequality cannot be reﬁned any
more). Then T2 is dually inessential because of the
collection T3, S
2
1 , . . . , S
2
k2
compose an overlapping
decomposition of T2 (and these are all dually essen-
tial). And so on until ﬁnally Tr is deemed redun-
dant because of T1, S
r
1 , . . . , S
r
kr
. Note that there
may be coalitions among S11 , . . . , S
2
1 , . . . , S
r
1 , . . . , S
r
kr
that coincide. Using indicator functions and the
conditions of inessentiality and dual inessentiality,
we get
eT1 = eT2 +
k1∑
j=1
eS1j (5)
eT2 = eT3 +
k2∑
j=1
eS2j − k2 · eN (6)
eT3 = eT4 +
k3∑
j=1
eS3j (7)
...
eTr = eT1 +
kr∑
j=1
eSrj − kr · eN (8)
Thus by summing (1)-(4) we obtain that
v(N) ≤ 1
k2 + k4 + · · ·+ kr
r∑
i=1
ki∑
j=1
v(Sij)
while from (5)-(8) we gather that
eN =
1
k2 + k4 + · · ·+ kr
r∑
i=1
ki∑
j=1
eSij
i.e. the collection S11 , . . . , S
2
1 , . . . , S
r
1 , . . . , S
r
kr
is bal-
anced. This contradicts the fact that the grand
coalition is vital.
4. Monotonic balanced games
Granot et al. [12] proposed a characterization
set for cost games. Informally, a coalition is called
saturated in a cost game if every new member would
increase the cost of the coalition (or putting it dif-
ferently, the coalition contains all the players that
could join for free). The grand coalition and the
empty set are not considered saturated, although
N would always ∅ would sometimes qualify. They
proved that the saturated coalitions together with
the (n− 1)-player coalitions, S(Γ), form a charac-
terization set in balanced monotonic cost games.
In fact Granot et al. [12] proved a slightly stronger
statement, namely, that the intersection of satu-
rated and essential coalitions forms a characteriza-
tion set in this class of games.
Similarly to the other characterization sets, S(Γ)
also induces a representation of the core C(Γ).
Let us mention here that just because a collec-
tion of coalitions determines the core it does not
necessarily characterize the nucleolus of the game.
Maschler et al. [20] presented two games with the
same core, but with diﬀerent nucleoli.
We now convert the concept of saturatedness to
monotonic proﬁt games based on the dualization
correspondence between proﬁt and cost games.
Deﬁnition 12 (Dually saturated coalitions). Let
(N, v) be a monotonic proﬁt game and S ∈ P be
an arbitrary non-trivial coalition. We say that S is
dually saturated if v(S \ i) < v(S) for any i ∈ S.
In other words every member contributes to the
worth of coalition S. Notice that although ∅ vacu-
ously always satisﬁes this property we do not call
it a dually saturated coalition. Similarly, also N is
not considered saturated even if it would qualify in
certain games. Observe that S ∈ P is saturated in
the monotonic cost game c if and only if N \S ∈ P
is dually saturated in the monotonic proﬁt game
c∗. Let DS+(Γ) denote the set of all dually satu-
rated coalitions and DS(Γ) = DS+(Γ) ∪ {i | i ∈
N}.
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The following deﬁnition is needed for our next
theorem. Let (N, v) be a monotonic game and S ∈
P a dually non-saturated coalition, then we say
that S 6= ∅ is a lower closure of S if S ⊂ S, v(S) =
v(S) and S is a dually saturated coalition. Note
that if S has no lower closure, then no member
contributes to the worth of S or to any subset of
S. Hence v(S) = v(i) = v(∅) = 0 for any i ∈ S.
Proposition 13. Let Γ = (N, v) be a monotonic
game with a non-empty core, then DS(Γ) forms a
characterization set for N(Γ).
Proof. Again we will use Theorem 4. Let S ∈ P be
a dually non-saturated coalition. If S has no lower
closure then v(S) = v(i) = 0 for any i ∈ S. From
this observation it also follows that satΓ({i}, x) ≤
satΓ(S, x) for any i ∈ S and for any allocation x.
Since all the singleton coalitions are included in
DS(Γ) by Theorem 4, S can be discarded. Finally
let S be a lower closure of S and let S \ S = T ,
then
satΓ(S, x) + x(T ) =x(S) + x(T )− v(S) =
= x(S)− v(S) = satΓ(S, x).
Since core vectors are non-negative this also
means satΓ(S, x) ≤ satΓ(S, x) for any x ∈ C(Γ).
Now we show that satΓ({i}, x) ≤ satΓ(S, x) for
any i ∈ T .
satΓ({i}, x) = x(i)− v(i) ≤ x(i) =
x(S)− x(S \ i) + v(S \ i)− v(S) =
satΓ(S, x)− satΓ(S \ i, x) ≤ satΓ(S, x)
We have shown that for any S ∈ P \ DS(Γ)
there exist a subcollection F of DS(Γ), such that
F fulﬁlls both conditions of Theorem 4. Hence
DS(Γ) is a characterization set for N(Γ).
Next we show a relationship between essential
and dually saturated coalitions.
Proposition 14. Let Γ = (N, v) be a monotonic
proﬁt game, then E(Γ) ⊆ DS(Γ).
Proof. The singleton coalitions are all members of
both E(Γ) and DS(Γ). Let S be a dually non-
saturated coalition such that |S| > 1. Then there
exists i ∈ S such that v(S) = v(S \ i). By mono-
tonicity v(i) ≥ 0, hence v(S) ≤ v(S \ i) + v(i).
Thus S is inessential.
There is a symmetrical result for dually essen-
tial and saturated coalitions. It can be shown
that if Γ = (N, c) is a monotonic cost game, then
DE(Γ) ⊆ S(Γ).
Let us say a few words about the applicability
of the above results. Sziklai [33] provides an ex-
ample where the dually essential coalitions help to
ﬁnd the nucleolus of directed acyclic graph games.
Dually essential coalitions seem to be more use-
ful than saturated coalitions since they deﬁne a
smaller characterization set, which in turn implies
a smaller LP. However usually it is also harder to
determine whether a coalition is dually essential
or not. Saturatedness on the other hand can be
checked easily. For instance for airport games [19]
there exist at most n saturated coalitions, which
can be easily determined from the characteristic
function. In case of bankruptcy games there can
be exponential many essential and dually essential
coalitions, however the size of their intersection is
always linear. In such games the grand coalition is
vital, hence Theorem 11 can be applied [32]. This
example is not an exception, but rather the general
case: balanced games with a vital grand coalition
represent almost all the class of balanced games
(see [10]), thus Theorem 11 can be very useful in
practice.
Finally let us stress that the four characteriza-
tion sets that we analyzed in this paper can only
help when the game in question has a non-empty
core. Göthe-Lundgren et al. [11] computed the nu-
cleolus of a vehicle routing game using the concept
of essential coalitions. However as Chardaire [4]
pointed out these games are not necessarily bal-
anced, hence their approach is ﬂawed.
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